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Abstract 
The paper argues that there are important links between asset prices and public finances which can 
strongly affect the variability of fiscal balances.  Asset prices affect fiscal balances via capital gains and 
turnover related taxes, and via wealth effects on consumption and indirect taxes.  The fiscal costs of asset 
price changes can be higher if government can be held liable for balance sheet losses from an asset price 
downturn.   
An empirical study finds significant effects of house and/or stock prices on revenue in a majority of 
the 17 OECD countries and revenue categories examined. On average, a 10-percent change in real estate 
and stock prices has a similar effect on the fiscal balance as a 1-percent change in output, although effects 
differ considerably across countries.  By 2001/2002, some countries’ fiscal balances seem upward biased, 
due to positive effects from earlier asset price booms.  
 
JEL codes:  H3, H6, E6, G1 
Keywords:  Fiscal policies, deficits, asset prices, revenue, fiscal institutions 
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Asset Prices and Fiscal Balances—A Non-Technical Summary 
 
The political and academic debate in recent years has given considerable attention to the short term 
stability and long term sustainability of public finances. This discussion has become particularly relevant in 
the EU since the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have introduced targets for 
deficits over the cycle (“close to balance or in surplus”) and ceilings on deficits and debt (3 and 60 percent 
of GDP, respectively). Fiscal effects from automatic stabilisers over the business cycle, high debt and 
population aging, are argued to justify the “close to balance or in surplus” requirement of the Stability and 
Growth Pact.  The latter provides a “safety margins” in budgetary positions so that the deficit limit is 
“normally” not breached even when automatic stabilisers operate over the cycle. 
The main shortcoming of the debate is perhaps the omission of asset price linkages with public 
finances which can introduce much additional variability into countries’ fiscal balances. To substantiate 
this claim, we first argue in this paper that fiscal policies and fiscal variables interact with asset prices.  As 
illustrated by a simple accounting framework, the main channels from asset prices to fiscal variables are 
direct effects on revenue through capital gains and turnover related taxes, and indirect effects through 
wealth effects on consumption. Moreover, fiscal effects can rise significantly when the government can be 
held liable for balance sheet losses incurred during an asset price downturn. 
An empirical study of the fiscal effects of real estate and stock price changes in 17 OECD countries 
confirms the relevance of such effects. In all countries, corporate income and capital transaction taxes are 
significantly affected by asset price changes and in a majority of countries this is also true for income taxes 
on households and indirect taxes.  The overall goodness of fit of equations increases considerably when 
asset price variables are added, as compared to the “traditional” literature looking only at fiscal and cyclical 
variables. 
With the findings on the elasticity of fiscal variables to asset price changes it is also possible to 
calculate revenue and budget sensitivities.  We find that in all countries, there is some risk of more 
variability in fiscal balances due to asset price changes but this risk differs considerably across countries. 
On average the budget sensitivity of a 10% asset price change is similar to a 1% output change. Moreover, 
as of 2001/2002, the study finds an upward bias in fiscal balances in a number of countries that experienced 
asset price booms in the late 1990s.  It suggests that a number of countries’ fiscal positions are vulnerable 
to asset price changes and reversals.   
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While asset price developments can give rise to significant fiscal effects, the impact on economic 
stability is not clear.  On the one hand, asset prices and growth tend to be correlated (albeit less on a year to 
year basis) so that the revenue effects may work counter-cyclically. However, revenue effects are often 
lagged so that a dampening/stimulating effect on demand and corporate financial positions continues well 
into asset price and (if correlated) conjunctural downturns/upswings.  Governments may also countervail 
the stabilising effect via discretionary tax or expenditure measures. 
As to policy implications, the findings suggest to be cautious when attributing improvements in the 
fiscal balance beyond normal cyclical effects to structural factors.  If asset price related, such factors might 
prove to be temporary. Moreover, when the additional revenue is treated as permanent by policy makers, it 
can result in an increase of expenditure commitments or tax cuts.  Fiscal effects from asset price changes 
are the result of the prevailing fiscal institutions.  Governments can assess and if necessary reform its fiscal 
system in light of its interaction with asset prices.  Care should be taken, however, that fiscal reform does 
not exacerbate the volatility of asset prices and thereby fiscal implications.  Finally, governments with 
fiscal variables sensitive to asset prices and which observe strong asset price increases might consider 
adjusting their budgetary safety margin to be prepared for the fiscal costs of an eventual downturn. 
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1. Introduction 
The political and academic debate in recent years has given considerable attention to the short term 
stability and long term sustainability of public finances. This discussion has become particularly relevant in 
the EU since the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have introduced targets for 
deficits over the cycle (“close to balance or in surplus”) and ceilings on deficits and debt (3 and 60 percent 
of GDP, respectively). Fiscal effects from automatic stabilisers over the business cycle, high debt and 
population aging, are argued to justify the “close to balance or in surplus” requirement of the Stability and 
Growth Pact.  The latter provides a “safety margins” in budgetary positions so that the deficit limit is 
“normally” not breached even when automatic stabilisers operate over the cycle. 
Much work has focused on fiscal effects arising from the budget sensitivity to output changes due 
to automatic stabilisers (van den Noord, 2000; Bouthevillain et al, 2001), the future costs of population 
aging under various economic and policy scenarios (Rother, Catenaro and Schwab, 2002; McMorrow & 
Roeger, 2002; Hagemann & Nicoletti, 1998), and an excessive debt level (Buiter, 1989). The size of the 
budget sensitivity, the debt and the future ageing-related costs determines the necessary ambitiousness of 
countries’ fiscal position to prevent a breach of the deficit and debt levels in the future. But these 
considerations and resulting calculations may underestimate the required safety margins if they have not 
focussed on all the major relevant factors that can strongly affect fiscal balances.   
To our mind, the main shortcoming of the debate is the omission of asset price linkages with public 
finances.
1 The study, therefore, has two main objectives. First, we will discuss the interrelationship 
between asset prices and public finances.  Fiscal policies can affect asset prices via the tax/subsidy system 
and via discretionary fiscal policies.  Of more concern for this study is the claim that asset price changes 
can have significant effects on fiscal variables via revenue channels, i.e. capital gains taxes, wealth effects 
on consumption and asset turnover taxes. In addition we discuss the fiscal costs from a government 
takeover of balance sheet losses. While these links are in principle well known, systematic studies are so 
far absent. 
Secondly, we conduct an econometric investigation of asset price effects on a number of tax 
revenue categories for 17 OECD countries. We show that various revenue categories are indeed 
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significantly affected by asset price changes in many countries. We also calculate related elasticities of 
budget variables to asset price changes.  Revenue effects from a 10 percent asset price change average 
0.4% of GDP but vary significantly between 0.1 and 0.8% of GDP.  Fiscal effects can hence be very 
important in some countries when asset prices rise or fall strongly. They can be stabilising when asset price 
changes coincide with the business cycle but lagged effects and political economy reasons raise doubts 
about this.  Finally, we find that some countries that experienced strong real estate booms in recent years 
may report fiscal positions that are embellished by these booms and that could be vulnerable to asset price 
reversals. However, in this study we do not look in detail at the implications of asset price adjustments on 
financial stability and the fiscal costs of bank and enterprises recapitalisation.  These typically affect fiscal 
balances via expenditure or government financial activities (rather than revenue) and are subject to more 
detailed analysis in Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002). 
Nevertheless, even without the more dramatic effects of financial instability, this study suggests 
that asset price related fiscal effects can strongly alter fiscal positions and jeopardize short term fiscal 
targets.  This risk is particularly large for countries where fiscal variables are sensitive to asset price 
changes and where asset prices have proven very volatile.  
The next section of the study discusses the interaction between asset prices and fiscal policies, 
develops a simple accounting framework and on that basis derives testable hypotheses. Sections three and 
four contain an econometric analysis and its results. The concluding section summarises and discusses 
some policy implications. 
 
2.  The relations between public finances and asset prices   
As mentioned, there is by now an important literature that examines the effects of economic 
fluctuations on fiscal variables and the budget balance.  This literature looks at economic flow variables, 
such as output or foreign demand, when assessing fiscal elasticities to economic shocks, and when 
subsequently deriving sensitivity measures of the budget to economic fluctuations.  This paper builds on 
and extends this analysis by looking at the interaction between asset prices and fiscal policies.  
The relationship between asset prices and public finances goes in both directions.  We first briefly 
discuss some channels via which fiscal policies can affect asset prices before turning to a more thorough 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1 An exception to this rather narrow focus of the “conventional” debate is the pioneering study by Hemming and 
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analysis of the effects of asset price changes on fiscal variables. Two of the most important assets from an 
economic perspective that also have a fiscal bearing are real estate and stocks, and the analysis in the paper 
is limited to these. 
 
A.  Fiscal policies affect asset prices via the tax/subsidy regime, discretionary policies and via the 
availability of government bailouts 
The first important channel by which fiscal policies affect asset prices is via the tax and subsidy 
system.  The latter influences asset prices mainly through their effect on after tax/subsidy rates of return.
2 
Increases in capital gains taxes reduce the after tax return and, thereby, the market value of assets. Turnover 
taxes can affect asset prices directly or indirectly (e.g. through their effect on market liquidity). Subsidising 
asset acquisition and ownership raises the after tax return of assets which, in turn, is likely raise their price.  
For example, mortgage interest deductibility or price-related subsidies for house purchases increase 
people’s willingness to pay for houses. Furthermore, quasi-fiscal, regulatory policies (for example, pension 
fund regulation, zoning regulation and “speculation”-related policies) can affect supply  and demand in 
asset markets.  
It is also important to note that discretionary policy changes can induce asset price changes. For 
example, if a country raises the deductibility of mortgage interest, this lowers the after tax interest rate for 
purchasing the asset on credit.  This, in turn, raises the expected value of the asset and is likely to 




The timing of such discretionary policy changes is important when it comes to determine whether 
fiscal policies exacerbate asset price swings or moderate them.  Conceptually, this is analogous to the 
debate offiscal policy effects on the cyclicality of output.  A reduction of mortgage tax credits at the 
beginning or during a downturn in house prices can raise the magnitude of the downturn.  Capital gains tax 
changes which raise the time period required to be exempted from such taxes, can reduce temporarily the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Petrie (2000) which discusses fiscal vulnerability from various angles, including to some extent those at the heart of 
this study. 
2 See, for example, Jonung and Stymne (1997) for such influences in Sweden in the later 1980s/early 1990s. 
 Tax and subsidy system 
 Discretionary fiscal policies 
 Contingent/implicit guarantees 
 
     Asset prices 
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supply of such assets.  If this happens during an upswing of asset prices, this measure could raise prices 
further.  Similarly, the abolition of capital gains taxes on the sale of shares during a boom phase is likely to 
magnify the boom. 
3  
  A further channel by which fiscal policies can affect asset prices relates to the rules for government 
bailouts of the private sector.  If private agents anticipate an (implicit or explicit) government guarantee for 
balance sheet losses, the anticipation of government bailouts can result in less prudent behaviour (moral 
hazard) by banks and investors and more volatile asset prices.  The latter, in turn, raises the probability that 
a government bailout is needed.  Whether such moral hazard problems exist, however, depends very much 
on countries’ rules for corporate governance and government bailouts.
4   
 
B.  Asset prices and their effect on fiscal variables 
As mentioned above, asset prices have not played a prominent role in the analysis of the 
determinants of fiscal variables and balances.  We argue that asset prices affect fiscal variables directly 
through two channels.
5 The first channel works through fiscal revenue.  It reflects the “orderly” reaction of 
fiscal variables to changes in asset prices (and financial sector balances) as determined by the existing 
fiscal/tax rules and institutions.  The second channel relates to situations of government bailouts which are 
often conducted in a more ad hoc manner, and which are not necessarily fully reflected in government 
budgets. 
As to the first channel, asset price changes are likely to affect capital gain/loss-related taxes. 
These are typically recorded as part of direct taxes on households and corporations.  Much, however, 
depends on the prevailing tax system. Personal income taxes may be affected in four ways: if the capital 
gains from private asset sales are taxed, if asset price effects on profits and dividends feed into personal 
income taxes, if (taxable) rental income changes with asset prices, and if interest payments (e.g. on 
                                                           
3 Fiscal policy changes can also moderate asset price variation but the problems with any type of discretionary fiscal 
policies (knowledge of position relative to cycle, implementation lags, difficulty to reverse policies) suggest caution 
with asset price oriented discretionary fiscal policy making. 
4 Gropp and Vesala (2002) argue this point very convincingly when discussing the role of deposit insurance schemes 
as setting clear limits for government liabilities and thereby reducing moral hazard. The importance of adequate 
capital, accounting rules and bank regulation and supervision in this context is frequently discussed in the literature. 
5 In addition, there can be second-round effects via output and government financing conditions.  If an asset price 
increase stimulates investment and consumption, the resulting output and employment effects will further boost 
revenue.  If asset price booms induce the government to raise interest rates, and if the government has a lot of short 
term debt and a large debt ratio, this may raise the government interest bill. E.g. a 1% interest rate increase on 100% 
of public debt of which 25% need to be refinanced within 12 months, would raise the interest bill by 0.1% in the first 
year and by 0.4% in the second year (see Eschenbach and Schuknecht, 2002 for a more detailed discussion). 
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mortgages) are tax deductible. Ownership structure and dispersion (for example, a high house ownership 
ratio) also affects the relation between asset prices and personal income tax revenue. If  the asset is an 
important element in household balance sheets (e.g., a significant share of wealth being held as stocks or 
real estate), revenue effects are also expected to be larger.   
Revenue from corporate income taxes is also likely to be affected by asset price changes if related 
gains affect the taxable base (most strongly perhaps in the financial sector).  Capital gains or losses may 
affect revenue immediately or with a lag, depending on tax rules and in particular whether capital gains are 
taxed when accrued or realised and over what time frame losses can be deducted.  
Given growing internationalisation of asset holdings, fiscal variables are not only subject to 
domestic asset price fluctuations.  A company holding assets abroad may have to pay tax on capital gains 
or may be able to write off losses against tax obligations at home. Financial sector balance sheets may 
become more vulnerable to developments abroad if a larger share of loans goes to foreigners.  On the other 
hand, internationally well-diversified portfolios may work like an insurance and, thereby, reduce the 
riskyness of balance sheets, and thereby also the volatility of fiscal variables.
6 
Moreover, asset prices affect consumption and thereby indirect taxes via so-called wealth effects. 
Household and firms feel richer when the value of their assets rises, even if they do not realize the profits, 
and confidence is likely to be affected positively. Wealth-effects are, hence, also a form of balance sheet 
effect.  Moreover, credit-worthiness of households and firms improves as the value of collateral rises.  
These effects stimulate consumption and (less importantly for immediate tax effects) investment.   
Countries with a broad distribution of house and stock ownership are more likely to experience such 
effects.  Financial market institutions that enhance the ability to turn paper wealth into consumption (e.g., 
via home equity loans) may also boost wealth effects. Hence, we hypothesize that asset price increases are 
significantly correlated with private consumption and indirect tax developments due to wealth effects. As 
much household wealth is in real property this is likely to be the more important transmission channel in 
most countries.
7 
                                                           
6Wealth taxes are also related to this channel although they are typically not recorded under direct taxes and their 
importance has declined in many countries in recent years. An exception is perhaps local property taxes.  They 
sometimes depend on the value of the real estate and may, thereby, work like a tax on wealth including accrued real 
estate capital gains. 
7 Recent literature has given more attention to wealth effects across assets and countries. See , for example, Case, Quigley and 
Shiller, 2001; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001; or Ludwig and Slok, 2002. 
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Governments also often draw revenue from transactions in assets, in the form of turnover taxes.  
These taxes are important especially regarding real estate transactions and can reach a noticeable share of 
total revenue.  To our knowledge, there is no industrial country that does not tax real estate transactions 
while many countries have abolished stock turnover taxes in recent years.  
Fourthly, balance sheet deterioration can turn into a government liability via a government 
bailout.   If asset price declines take on major proportions and are coupled with corporate and/or financial 
sector difficulties, significant additional fiscal costs to the government can arise from helping out insolvent 
companies and banks. If an asset price fall results in difficulties for the corporate sector, the government 
may be burdened by called-up guarantees on loans.  If the industry is important for political reasons (say as 
an important regional employer), the government may also be inclined to provide subsidies or other types 
of emergency assistance.  More importantly, the government may have implicit or explicit contingent 
liabilities in the financial system, where non-performing loans due to asset price declines may bring down 
banks and induce government support.  
Conceptually such bailouts are equivalent to a capital gains tax (which as a mirror image implies 
the deductability of losses from tax obligations). A full loss-takeover by government is equivalent to a tax 
rate of 100%.  Such obligations can be very important in quantitative terms (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996). 
However, bailouts are likely to affect public finances through other channels than revenues. They are often 
financed in an ad hoc manner through budgetary subsidies or government financial activities.  The latter 
could take the form of equity injections or the purchase of bad loans via a holding company which after 
completion of its task is liquidated with the government footing the bill.  This latter method would augment 
the debt but not necessarily affect the budget deficit. Moreover, the effect of bailouts on revenue is 
uncertain.  They may re-establish a company’s ability to pay taxes more quickly than a scenario when 
losses have to feed fully through corporate balance sheets, thereby possibly depressing receipts even well 
after the losses were incurred.   
 
A simple accounting framework 
 
The implications of asset price/valuation changes on fiscal variables described above can be 
illustrated in a very simple accounting framework with two sectors, private and government.
8 There are 
                                                           
8 There are many simplifying assumptions underlying this framework, including for example the current account 
balance corresponding to the savings-investment balance (hence no capital transfers).   
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four types of taxes ty, levied on income Y, tc levied on consumption cyY, tw levied on capital gains ￿w, and 
tt levied on capital/wealth turnover ￿w. There are no collection lags. Assets/wealth are only held by the 
private sector.  Private and public sector savings including links to asset prices/changes in wealth are 





1)      w t w t w t c Y c t Y t S t w w w y c y p            1 1 1  
 
2)   g t w w w y c y g C w t w t w t c Y c t Y t S           1  
 
 
Changes in private and public sector financial balance sheets differ from savings due to investment 
and changes in (private) wealth (adjusted for taxes) (equations 3 and 4).  
 
 
Financial balance sheets 
 
3)        w t I w t w t c Y c t Y t FB w p t w w y c y p             1 1 1 1   
 
4)   g g t w w c w y c y g I C w t w t c t w t Y c t Y t FB            1  
 
 
An increase in asset prices/asset valuation can have a negative effect on private savings if 
individuals consume more and have to pay capital gains taxes (5).  Public sector savings would then 
increase but by less then the decline in private savings (6).  The difference between (5) and (6) is the 
additional consumption due to asset price/wealth increases (wealth effects, adjusted for consumption and 
capital gains taxes. Assuming constant investment, this changes the economy’s savings-investment/current 
account balance (7). 
 
 
Changes in savings due to asset price changes 
 
5)     t w w w c
p
t t t c t
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S
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1  current account 
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Most importantly for our analysis, we can also calculate the change in private and public sector 
financial balance sheets.  Private sector balance sheets improve in an asset price upturn by the valuation 
increase adjusted for taxes and wealth effects (8).  Public sector balance sheets also improve by the tax 





Changes in financial balance sheets due to asset price effects 
 
8)     t w w c w
p
t t c t t
w
FB
     
 

1 1 1  
 
9)        
 

 t w w c w
g
t t c t t
w
FB
1  fiscal balance 
 
 
Tax rates tw normally operate symmetrically during an upturn and dowturn of asset prices.  Hence 
governments in fact finance part of private balance sheet losses if such losses can be deducted from the 
income tax burden.  A government bailout of private sector financial losses can be illustrated by an 
asymmetric tax rate tw which takes a different value during a downturn than during an upturn.  In the 
extreme case, where the government takes over all losses, the implicit tax rate tw is 100%.  This 
formalisation, though illustrative, is nevertheless rather crude as it assumes some kind of tax rule on which 
the bail-out is based (an “orderly” adjustment) while this is typically not the case. 
Moreover, there may be important interaction effects which are not considered in this accounting 
framework.  Tax bases (such as compensation of employees) may not only affect revenue but also asset 
prices so that there could be multicollinearity between the three variables.  Asset price changes can affect 
output indirectly, e.g., via second round effects from higher consumption and investment.
9   
Summarising these considerations on the transmission of asset price changes to fiscal variables, 
three straightforward and testable hypotheses as to the interaction with direct, indirect and turnover tax 
revenue emerge: 
1)  Asset price changes are expected to significantly affect direct tax receipts from corporations 
and households via capital gains taxes. 
                                                           
9 This would suggest a general equilibrium analysis. However, the fact that the full extent of asset valuation 
changes is difficult to explain in existing models, and asset valuation losses seem to disappear partly into “black 
holes” suggests caution to such an approach. See the finance literature for more details (e.g. Dai et al, 2000). 
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2)  Asset price changes are anticipated to affect indirect tax receipts via wealth effects on private 
consumption. 
3)  Asset price changes are likely to affect tax receipts from capital transactions. 
In contrast, episodes with government bailouts in the context of financial instability do not yield 
such straightforward hypothesis. For these events,  it would not be appropriate to look only at the effect of 
asset prices on revenue as this would not be the full picture of fiscal effects, but to have a more 
encompassing view of the effect on both budget variables and debt.  As to methods, case studies (rather 
than econometrics) of the full fiscal effect (and not only on revenue and deficits) would seem the 
appropriate form of studying such events. Eschenbach and Schuknecht (2002) have endeavoured such an 
analysis of countries experiencing strong asset price fluctuations, financial instability and government 
bailout.  In contrast , this study is limited to analysing the channels and magnitudes by which asset price 
changes affect revenue only.  Note, however, that the revenue effects studied here are likely to occur during 
both “normal” and “crisis” times.  
 
3  An econometric study of links between asset prices and fiscal variables 
A.  General Formulation of Estimation Equations and Explanation of Variables  
In the following we conduct an econometric analysis of the relation between asset prices and fiscal 
revenue from direct, indirect and capital turnover taxes. We distinguish three estimation equations, based 
on the hypotheses on the transmission channels identified above.  
 
Model formulation 
As to the first equation, direct taxes on households and corporations are expected to be determined 
by their traditional tax bases, i.e., compensation of employees and gross operating surplus. In addition, we 
anticipate a revenue effect from asset price changes via capital gains-related taxes. 
(1) direct tax revenue = f (compensation of employees/gross operating surplus; asset price effects 
on capital gains) 
 
In the second equation, indirect taxes are determined by private consumption which, in turn, is traditionally 
a function of disposable income.  We test this second relationship by adding asset prices as proxies for 
wealth effects on private consumption.   
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(2) indirect tax revenue = f (private consumption) 
private consumption = f (disposable income, asset price related wealth effects)  
                                            
 
The third equation refers to taxes on financial and capital transactions. These are exclusively 
determined by asset transactions: 
(3) capital turnover tax-related revenue = f (asset prices proxying  turnover) 
 
Variable selection 
In all three equations, the dependent variables and the independent variables reflecting traditional 
tax bases are all readily available.  The latter are in fact the channels examined by the literature on the 
cyclical adjustment of budget balances.  
The fiscally most relevant assets, as mentioned above, are stocks and real estate.  However, we do 
not know the effect of changes in these asset prices on tax bases, i.e., the capital gains tax base, wealth-
induced effects on private consumption or the base for turnover taxes, and related changes in the tax base 
have to be approximated. In principle, asset valuations, i.e. price times quantity, would be the best proxies. 
However, quantity data on real property are not available for longer time series if at all. Stock market 
valuation data is more readily available although time series are also rather short. We, therefore, use two 
asset price indicators, i.e. stock prices and real estate/property prices as proxies in the estimations.
10 
Finally, we include dummy variables to capture important tax reforms (e.g., the Swedish tax 
reforms of the early 1990s) or special events/shocks (e.g., German unification) that are likely to have 
significant effects on fiscal revenue.  This procedure is second best to a clear account of discretionary 
measures and shocks and quantitative estimates of their revenue impact.   Nevertheless, in the absence of 
such information, this is an improvement over the literature where discretionary measures are not reflected 
in the estimations. 
 
Expected timing of impact from asset price variables 
                                                           
10 From a short term fiscal perspective, price rather than valuation indices are not problematic, because quantities 
change much more slowly than prices. Another concern could be the comparability of asset price indicators across 
countries. Some indices are broader than others, so that a direct comparability is not possible. This is not of great 
importance here, because as discussed in more detail below, we apply time-series techniques on a country by country 
basis, and not panel analysis. The main criterion for the choice of index is its broad market coverage which is satisfied 
in all countries in our sample. 
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The expected timing of the fiscal impact from asset price variables is also worth discussing.   As 
regards direct taxes, we expect an immediate or a lagged positive (negative) impact from asset price 
increases (decrease) depending on when taxes on capital gains are typically paid.  Moreover, the 
deductibility of mortgage interest payments from personal income tax in some countries may result in an 
immediate or lagged negative impact of a house price increase on fiscal revenue. 
As regards wealth effects on consumption, an immediate or a lagged impact are both possible, 
depending on when the asset price adjustment occurred and with what lags consumers react to the increase.  
It is also conceivable, that the immediate impact of asset price changes is higher than the permanent one, so 
that a partial reversal of the impact would be found.  Finally, as regards capital turnover taxes, immediate 
and lagged effects are possible, depending on the timing of asset price changes and collection lags. 
 
B.  The Countries and the Data 
We focus on 17 industrialised OECD countries with well-developed asset markets and good data 
availability: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. Some industrialised countries had to be 
omitted due to poor data availability (for instance Portugal and Greece). 
 
Basic Revenue and Tax Base related Data 
The database contains aggregate nominal data in billions of national currency for the four tax categories 
and for the respective tax bases on an annual basis. The tax data were taken from the OECD Revenue 
Statistics database. Sources of tax base data are Ameco and OECD. Annex Table 1 provides an overview of 
the data, their sources and periods covered. 
 
Asset Price Data 
Real estate prices were provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and refer to residential 
property. Stock prices are mainly from BIS and Datastream. All stock indices are broad market indices, not 
focussed on specific segments. Annex Table 2 provides detailed information about data sources and 
coverage. 
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C. Regression  analysis 
The regressions apply time series analysis on an individual country basis. Tax systems differ 
across countries so that coefficients and their significance are also likely to differ. Examples for this 
include differences in the taxation of capital gains (accrued, realised, none), variations in the treatment of 
mortgage interest deductibility, differences in the importance and dispersion of asset holding and hence 
wealth effects, etc.  Given these significant differences across countries, panel data analysis is less useful.  
  We apply OLS to test for elasticities of revenue variables to asset price changes. All models are 
estimated in the first differences of the logarithmic data in order to approximate growth rates.
11 We  take 
account of potential interaction between tax bases and asset price variables. Multicollinearity, however, 
turns out not to be a serious concern as correlation coefficients for tax bases and asset price variables are 
not very high. Other indications of multicollinearity, like equations with a good model fit in combination 
with poor t-statistics could not be detected either.  This result is plausible in the light of the short-run 
relationship that we examine. 
12.   
 
The Econometric Specifications 
We test two different models.  The basic model estimates elasticities of various taxes with respect 
to their “traditional” base (e.g. compensation of employees), in line with the existing literature analysing 
budget sensitivities to cyclical fluctuations. This basic model (model 1) has been specified as follows: 
 
(1)  t t t t e base d revenue d    1 , 2 1 ln * ln  
13 
For the taxes on financial and capital transactions, asset price variables constitute the base and the 
basic model (1a) looks as follows: 
 
                                                           
11This is necessary because of unit roots. We also check for cointegration and estimate an error correction model 
where needed. We use nominal data in order to avoid problems arising from different deflators. From an econometric 
point of view this is analogous to using the same deflator for all variables. When assessing the quality of the 
estimation we apply the following standard tests: Jarque-Bera normality test; Durbin-Watson first-order 
autocorrelation test; Breusch-Godfrey second-order autocorrelation test; White heteroscedasticity test. 
12 Asset prices and tax bases do not necessarily affect each other very strongly in the short run, whereas they seem to 
have a stable long-run relationship via output. But this is not subject to our analysis. 
13 In the category direct taxes on companies we use a second lag of the tax base in some cases. This additional lag may 
be justified as tax legislation can allow significant reperiodization of  profits and losses.  
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(1a)  t t t t t t e ice propertypr d stockprice d revenue d       1 , 3 1 , 2 1 ln * ln * ln     
 
In the next step the basic model for the estimation of direct and indirect tax effects is augmented by 
asset price variables to test the hypothesis that these revenue categories are affected by stock and property 
prices.  Moreover, dummy variables are added, as described above.  This model (2) is our “best model” and 
generally takes the following specification
14: 
 
(2)        
t t t t t
t t t t t
e dummy stockprice d





1 , 5 1 , 4
1 , 3 1 , 2 1
* ln *





For financial and capital transactions, the basic model is not supplemented by a best model because asset 
prices already proxy the tax base of the basic model.  
 
4. Results 
A.  Qualitative results as to the significance of coefficients 
The estimation results confirm the relevance of our hypotheses for a majority of countries and tax 
categories. Results are best for transaction and corporate income taxes, followed by indirect and personal 
income taxes. In about half the countries all four categories are affected by at least one of the asset price 
variables but all other countries also show at least some impact on revenue from asset price changes. 
Property prices tend to have a stronger and more significant impact than stock prices on average. 
More specifically, Table 1 reports on the qualitative results of estimations across countries, tax categories 
and assets. A plus indicates a significant coefficient in the respective country and tax category cell.  At the 
bottom of the table, the number of countries for which at least one of the asset price variables proved 
relevant in explaining the respective revenue is reported.  In all countries, asset price changes affect 
corporate income and capital turnover taxes; in 75% of them, asset prices affect indirect tax revenue; and in 
about half the countries personal income tax.  
  The table also shows that property prices are significantly correlated with indirect and capital 
transaction taxes in a large number of countries.  Real estate-related effects are less significant for direct 
                                                           
14 Model (2) is a standard type of the best model. The exact specification depends on the respective country , the type 
of tax, the asset price category, and econometric criteria. See table 3 for detailed information. 
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taxes on corporations and in particular households. Stock prices matter most frequently for corporate 
income and capital transaction taxes.  In 55 of the 67 estimations, at least one of the asset price variables 
shows a significant effect on revenue. 
The last column of Table 1 provides a qualitative indicator of the asset price sensitivity of 
countries’ fiscal variables. It sums the number of tax categories with significant coefficients by country. In 
about half of the countries, all four revenue categories proved sensitive to property and/or stock price 
changes, hence an indicator of 4. These include the four Anglo-Saxon countries, Italy, Japan, Norway and 
Sweden.  Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Spain report three revenue categories with 
significant coefficients.  Switzerland, Belgium, Canada and Germany only report significant effects for two 
categories (corporate and turnover tax).  
 
B.  Quantitative results as to the sign and size of elasticities 
Quantitative results on the effect of asset prices on fiscal variables suggest that such changes are 
important determinants of revenue. Table 2 reports on these results and provides asset price elasticities 
according to the asset price augmented regression model (model 2). Elasticities are reported with respect to 
the periods in which they occur (contemporaneous or lagged; see also Annex Table 3 for more details on 
the estimations).
15 For the four tax categories, property prices tend to have larger elasticities than stock 
price changes. However, given that asset prices are often much more volatile than output with changes of 
20 percent or more per annum no rarity and that effects are cumulative over time, even small elasticities 
can potentially have significant revenue implications. We will return to this question below when we derive 
asset-price related budget sensitivities. 
As regards direct taxes on households, Table 2 finds that a majority of countries report either a 
significant impact of property or of stock price changes on revenue. The elasticity of revenue to real estate 
price changes ranges from 0.69 to –0.42. The comparable figures for stock prices are between 0 and 0.16. 
Real estate price increases have an initial negative effect on direct taxes in Australia and the United 
Kingdom, probably due to rising mortgage interest payments that can be deducted from the income tax 
burden. In the United Kingdom, the initial negative impact is more than reversed in the following period.  
In Spain and Sweden, the initial positive effect is subsequently partly reversed.  The net (combined 
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immediate and lagged) elasticity is always positive except in the case of Australia and ranges up to 0.33 in 
Italy.
16 Annex Table 3 shows that the elasticity of the standard tax base (compensation of employees) to 
revenue generally changes somewhat in the opposite direction of the asset price influence when comparing 
the basic model (1) with model (2).    
As regards direct tax on corporations, all countries report a significant, positive revenue impact 
of real estate prices, stock prices or both. Elasticities are relatively large for real estate prices (ranging from 
0.4 to 1.4) and somewhat smaller for stock prices (largely between 0.2 and 0.4). The elasticity of the 
standard tax base (gross operating surplus) to revenue mostly but not always moves closer to one in model 
2, compared to model 1. 
As regards indirect taxes via private consumption, a large majority of countries report a 
significant, positive revenue impact of real estate prices, stock prices or both on private consumption (and 
thereby indirectly on indirect tax revenue). In four countries, this effect is partly reversed in the following 
period, as part of the capital gain may be seen as a windfall that leads to a one-off increase in consumption. 
The net elasticity ranges from 0.03 (Australia) to 0.21 (Denmark) for real estate prices and from 0.02 to 
0.04 for stocks.  This is consistent with the literature on wealth effects where similar magnitudes for short 
term stock price-related wealth effects and considerably larger real estate-related effects have been found 
across countries.
17 The elasticity of the standard tax base (disposable income) to private consumption 
declines marginally for most countries when comparing the basic model with the model 2 estimations.  
As regards taxes on financial and capital transactions, again all countries report a significant, 
positive revenue impact of real estate prices, stock prices or both on these taxes. In some cases, this effect 
is partly reversed in the following period. Elasticities are relatively large for real estate prices (often 
exceeding 1) and somewhat smaller for stock prices (mostly between 0.2 and 0.5).  
 
C.  Improvement in the overall model fit 
 
The overall model fit improves significantly in most estimations where asset price variables are 
added and have significant coefficients. Table 3 reports the R
2 adjusted for the basic model (1) for all 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
15 For indirect taxes, Table 2 only reports the elasticity of private consumption to asset prices.  However, given that 
the elasticity of indirect taxes to private consumption is near 1, we prefer to report the unchanged values of the 
estimations which are consistent with the Annex Table 3 reporting the detailed results. 
16 There are nevertheless some puzzles in these findings, including the relatively high value for Italy and the partial 
reversal in Spain and Sweden.  These are perhaps related to institutional factors in these countries. 
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countries and for the asset price augmented model (2) for those countries where at least one of the asset 
price variables has a significant coefficient (except for turnover taxes where there is only one 
specification). At the bottom of the table, we also report the change in the unweighted average across 
countries between models (1) and (2), i.e. the average improvement due to adding asset price variables. The 
greatest improvement in relative and absolute terms is on corporate income tax but the average model fit 
also improves significantly for the other revenue categories. On top of that F-tests suggest that the 0-
hypothesis of no significant overall fit can be rejected at the 95% level in all estimations (except in one 
case, where it can only be rejected at the 85% level).  
As to direct taxes on households, the goodness of fit on the basis of compensation of employees 
alone averages 0.5, ranging from 0.3 to 0.76. Asset price variables improve this fit in 9 countries by an 
average of 0.2, ranging from a marginal increase to an improvement by 0.4.As to direct taxes on 
corporations, the goodness of fit on the basis of gross operating profits alone averages 0.2, ranging from 
near 0 to 0.57. Asset price variables on average double this value. In all countries, the overall fit improves, 
ranging from 0.02 to above 0.5.  The model fit is highest in Australia, Belgium, France, Japan and the UK. 
As to indirect taxes via private consumption, the goodness of fit on the basis of disposable income alone is 
already very high and averages 0.78. Asset price variables improve this fit by an average of almost 0.1, 
with only one country reporting an unchanged model fit (UK) and two countries an improvement of 0.2 or 
higher. As to taxes on financial and capital transactions, the goodness of fit on the basis of the two types of 
asset prices variables alone averages near 0.5.  Only two countries (Italy and Sweden) report a very low 
value below 0.25 while Belgium, Finland, Germany and Norway report an R2 adjusted above 0.6.  
 
D.  Asset price-related sensitivities of fiscal variables 
On the basis of the above estimations, we can calculate the sensitivity of revenue and fiscal 
balances to asset price changes. These sensitivities could be useful both for assessing past biases in fiscal 
variables and for forecasting fiscal effects of future asset price adjustments. We do so by weighting the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
17 Institutional factors (e.g. the holding of real estate and stocks in finds rather than private accounts) may again help 
explain some peculiarities.  However, a more detailed discussion would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
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estimated elasticities with the revenue share of GDP for each tax category, asset price variable and country. 
Table 4 reports the results on the basis of 1998 revenue shares in GDP. 
18 
For some countries, total sensitivities are relatively modest (0.1-0.2) but for one third they are 
important (0.3-0.4) and for another third they are very large, reaching or exceeding 0.5. The latter 
sensitivity, for example, implies that a 20 percent asset price increase would improve the fiscal balance by 
1 percent of GDP, and a reversal of such an increase would have the same adverse effect on a country’s 
fiscal position.  While most sensitivities of individual tax categories are relatively small, they add up to 
significant effects in some countries. Nevertheless, it is difficult to generalise findings, as there are 
important differences across countries, reflecting also very different tax systems. 
Table 4 distinguishes immediate, lagged and combined asset price sensitivities for total revenue 
and for the four revenue categories.  Column 1 reports total sensitivities.  These average 0.38, i.e., a 10 
percent increase of both stocks and real estate will raise revenue by 0.38% of GDP after one period. On 
average across the 17 countries, most of the effect is immediate.  Comparing asset price and output 
sensitivities of fiscal balances, the effect of the former (looking at a 10% change) is hence similar on 
average to the latter (for a 1% output change). However, differences are enormous and greater than the 
difference in budget sensitivities across countries.  Total elasticities are relatively low between 0 and  0.2 in 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany and Switzerland.  Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden 
and the US report sensitivities around the average.  Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain and the UK 
show sensitivities of 0.5 or above.   
When looking at the sensitivity of fiscal variables to stock versus real estate price changes (a-
columns versus b-columns), real estate are clearly more important and explain about two thirds of the 
overall sensitivity.  On average, real estate price changes affect household tax and indirect tax revenue 
immediately and quite strongly before part of the effect is reversed in the subsequent period in some 
countries (columns 2a- and 4a).  Both real estate and stock prices affect receipts from corporate tax revenue 
mainly with a lag (columns 3a and 3b).  
 
 
                                                           
18 Assume for example, that the estimated elasticity of  corporate taxes to real estate price change is 0.5 and the 
revenue ratio is 4% of GDP.  Assuming linear effects, a 10 percent real estate price increase has a revenue effect of 
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E.  Fiscal balances as affected by the late-1990s property and stock price boom 
  The previous findings about the sensitivity of fiscal variables to asset price changes can 
now be applied to the stock and property price booms in a number of countries in the late 1990s.  We 
looked at 8 countries, including Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the 
US to estimate the possible upward bias in fiscal balances due to asset price changes over the 1997-2001 
period (assuming implicitly that the former was a year with near “equilibrium” asset prices).  In order to be 
conservative, we only look at real asset price increases (i.e., increases above the CPI) and we apply the 
sensitivities presented in Table 4 separately for stocks and real estate.  Note, however, that we do not know 
whether 1997 prices were in fact "near equilibrium".  Neither do we know whether elasticities can be 
applied to large asset price changes (although non-linearity tests were not significant). Moreover, another 
word of caution is warranted as these estimates are based on a 30-year period and may not always reflect 
the most recent tax regime and/or behaviour of consumers/tax payers. 
Table 5 reports the results that suggest a significant upward bias in revenue and fiscal positions in 
all 8 countries.  Real estate prices increased in “real” terms by between 16 and 70 percent over the 1997 to 
2001 period and stock prices by –12 to 89 percent.  Real estate prices exerted a favourable effect of 0.1% to 
2.5% of GDP on fiscal balances and stocks between -0.1% and 1.5% of GDP.  The total effect is around 1 
½% of GDP for most countries and ranges between 0.8% for the US and 3.0% for Ireland.  Applying our 
findings symmetrically and not considering the caveats from the previous page, the fiscal balance would 
also worsen by this magnitude, should “real” asset prices reverse to their 1997 level.  
 
F.  Asset price effects on public finances and stabilisation 
Finally, the question arises whether asset price related fiscal effects contribute to economic 
stabilisation.  Asset prices are strongly correlated with output over time. When looking at industrialised 
country data as used in this study, the correlation between nominal GDP and asset price level indices is 
largely 0.8 or greater. Nevertheless, the variance of asset price changes is much larger than for output, and 
the correlation in the rates of changes (short term correlation) is much smaller than in the levels.  When 
looking at long term trend, it also appears that the number of “asset price cycles” seems to be much fewer 
than the number of business cycles.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
0.2% of GDP (10*5%*4%). 1998 was chosen as a reference year for revenue shares as the latter were not yet distorted 
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If asset prices and the business cycle are correlated, asset price related fiscal effects may to some extent 
contribute to economic stabilisation, as additional revenue withdraws demand during periods of strong 
growth and vice versa.  Nevertheless, caution is warranted in drawing this conclusion for two reasons.  
First, some revenue effects are lagged, in particular on corporate tax revenue.  Hence, corporate balance 
sheets and the financial positions of companies, which are probably already suffering from declining 
profitability at the end of a boom, may be further battered by lagged fiscal obligations from capital gains 
taxes.  Similarly, at the end of a recession rising profitability may coincide with the fiscal effects from 
writing off earlier capital losses.  This may in fact exacerbate the volatility in business behaviour.   
Assuming a stabilising effect on consumer behaviour, the net effect is unclear. 
Another uncertainty is government itself.  If for example, additional revenue from asset price increases 
during an asset price boom coincides with an economic upswing and the government rapidly turns this 
revenue into higher spending or tax cuts, the stabilising effect may be undone by fiscal loosening.  This risk 
is particularly great if governments are not aware of the transitory nature of such revenue.  Deteriorating 
fiscal balances during an asset price downturn may then induce/require the government to take 
countervailing restrictive action, compensating any stabilising fiscal effects from the asset price decline.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have argued in this paper that fiscal policies and fiscal variables interact with asset prices.  As 
illustrated by a simple accounting framework, the main channel from asset prices to fiscal variables is via 
direct effects on revenue through capital gains and turnover related taxes, and indirect effects through 
wealth effects on consumption. Moreover, fiscal effects can rise significantly when the government can be 
held liable for balance sheet losses incurred during an asset price downturn (e.g. via banking sector 
support) an issue we did not study further here (but see Eschenbach and Schuknecht, 2002). 
An empirical study of the fiscal effects of real estate and house price changes in 17 OECD 
countries confirms the relevance of such effects. In all countries, corporate income and capital transaction 
taxes are significantly affected by asset price changes and in a majority of countries this is also true for 
income taxes on households and indirect taxes.  The overall goodness of fit of equations increases 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
significantly due to asset price related revenue effects from the late 1990s’ asset price boom in some countries. 
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considerably when asset price variables are added, as compared to the “traditional” literature looking only 
at fiscal and cyclical variables. 
With the findings on the elasticity of fiscal variables to asset price changes it is also possible to 
calculate revenue and budget sensitivities.  We find that in all countries, there is some risk of more 
variability in fiscal balances due to asset price changes but this risk differs considerably across countries.  
In 1/3 of the countries, sensitivities are relatively modest whereby a sensitivity of 0.1-0.2 suggests that a 10 
percent increase in house and stock prices yields additional revenue of about 0.1-0.2% of GDP.  In another 
third, the sensitivity is more important, between 0.3 and 0.4.  In the remaining third of the countries, this 
sensitivity is 0.5 or higher so that large asset price changes (say, of 20%) can have very significant fiscal 
effects (of 1 percent of GDP or higher).  The sensitivity of fiscal variables to house prices explains about 
2/3 of the overall sensitivity, although there are considerable differences as to the magnitude and timing 
across countries.  On average the budget sensitivity of a 10% asset price change is hence quite similar to a 
1% output change. 
The findings can be applied to forecasting future fiscal effects of anticipated asset price changes 
and to analysing recent asset price developments.  When applying the estimated elasticities to CPI adjusted 
real estate and stock price developments between 1997 and 2001 in 8 industrialised countries with 
significant real estate price increases, we find positive revenue effects of  between 0.8 and 3 percent of 
GDP.  This is indicative of an upward bias in fiscal balances which could turn around by a similar 
magnitude, should asset price reverse.  It suggests that a number of countries’ fiscal positions are 
vulnerable to asset price changes and reversals.  However, a word of caution is warranted. Equilibrium 
asset prices are unknown (and any changes hence difficult to predict), elasticities may not be linear for very 
large asset price changes, and estimates are based on 30 year periods and may not always reflect the most 
recent tax regime and/or behaviour of consumers/tax payers. 
While asset price developments can give rise to significant fiscal effects, the impact on economic 
stability is not clear.  On the one hand, asset prices and growth tend to be correlated (albeit less on a year to 
year basis) so that the revenue effects may work counter-cyclically. However, revenue effects are often 
lagged so that a dampening/stimulating effect on demand and corporate financial positions continues well 
into asset price and (if correlated) conjunctural downturns/upswings.  Governments may also countervail 
the stabilising effect via discretionary tax or expenditure measures. 
ECB • Working Paper No 141 • May 2002 26As to policy implications, the findings suggest to be cautious when attributing improvements in the 
fiscal balance beyond normal cyclical effects to structural factors.  If asset price related, such factors might 
prove to be temporary. Moreover, when the additional revenue is treated as permanent by policy makers, it 
can result in an increase of expenditure commitments or in tax cuts.   Fiscal effects from asset price 
changes are the result of the prevailing fiscal institutions.  Governments can assess and if necessary reform 
its fiscal system in light of its interaction with asset prices.  Care should be taken, however, that fiscal 
reform does not exacerbate the volatility of asset prices and thereby fiscal implications.  Finally, 
governments with fiscal variables sensitive to asset prices and which observe strong asset price increases 
might consider adjusting their budgetary safety margin to be prepared for the fiscal costs of an eventual 
downturn.  
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Table 1: Qualitative Summary Findings of Asset Price Effects on Different Tax Categories
direct taxes  direct taxes  indirect taxes taxes on financial &  number of 
on households on companies capital transactions significant
tax 
real estate stocks real estate stocks real estate stocks real estate stocks categories
A u s t r a l i a ++ ++ +0 0+ 4
Belgium 0 0 0 + 0 0 + + 2
Canada 0 0 0 + + 0 n.a. n.a. 2
D e n m a r k 0 0+ 0+ 0+ + 3
Finland 0 0 0 + + + + 0 3
F r a n c e 00 0+ +0 ++ 3
G e r m a n y 0 00 +0 0+ 0 2
I r e l a n d 0 +0 ++ 0+ + 4
I t a l y +0 +0 0+ +0 4
J a p a n 0+ ++ 0+ 0+ 4
N e t h e r l a n d s 0 00 ++ 0+ + 3
N o r w a y +0 0+ ++ +0 4
Spain + 0 + + 0 0 + 0 3
S w e d e n +0 0+ ++ +0 4
S w i t z e r l a n d 0 0+ 00 00 + 2
U K +0 ++ +0 ++ 4
U S A 0 +0 ++ ++ + 4
Total / average 9/17 17/17 13/17 16/16 3.2






















Table 2: Summary of Asset Price Elasticities 
direct taxes on direct taxes on  indirect taxes taxes on financial &
asset price households companies capital transactions
category lag real estate stocks real estate stocks real estate stocks real estate stocks
Australia 0 - - 0.51 0.21 0.15 - - 0.40
-1 -0.42 0.09 - - -0.12 - - -
-0.42 0.09 0.51 0.21 0.03 - - 0.40
Belgium 0 - - - 0.21 - - 1.19 0.44
- 1 ----- - - -
- - - 0.21 - - 1.19 0.44
Canada 0 - - - 0.31 0.11 - n.a. n.a.
- 1 ---- - 0 . 0 7 - n . a . n . a .
- - - 0.31 0.04 - n.a. n.a.
D e n m a r k 0 ---- 0 . 2 1 - 1 . 0 6 -
-1 - - 1.38 - - - 0.83 0.23
- - 1.38 - 0.21 - 1.89 0.23
F i n l a n d 0 ---- 0 . 0 9 - 0 . 7 0 -
- 1 --- 0 . 3 0 - 0 . 0 3 0 . 3 5 -
- - - 0.30 0.09 0.03 1.05 -
F r a n c e 0 ---- 0 . 1 5 - 1 . 2 5 0 . 2 4
- 1 --- 0 . 3 0 - 0 . 1 0 - - -
- - - 0.30 0.05 - 1.25 0.24
Germany 0 - - - 0.24 - - 0.40 -
- 1 ----- - - -
- - - 0.24 - - 0.40 -
I r e l a n d 0 ---- 0 . 1 6 - 1 . 4 0 0 . 2 3
- 1 - 0 . 1 0 - 0 . 1 9 ----
- 0.10 - 0.19 0.16 - 1.40 0.23
Italy 0 0.33 - - - - 0.02 0.30 -
-1 - - 0.46 - - - - -
0.33 - 0.46 - - 0.02 0.30 -
Japan 0 - 0.16 0.57 0.19 - 0.02 - 0.26
- 1 ----- - - -
- 0 . 1 60 . 5 70 . 1 9 - 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 2 6
Netherlands 0 - - - 0.24 0.07 - 1.11 0.27
- 1 ----- - - -
- - - 0.24 0.07 - 1.11 0.27
Norway 0 0.22 - - - 0.16 - 1.19 -
- 1 --- 0 . 2 9 - 0 . 0 4 - -
0.22 - - 0.29 0.16 0.04 1.19 -
Spain 0 0.69 - 0.57 0.20 - - 0.57 -
-1 -0.39 - - - - - - -
0.30 - 0.57 0.20 - - 0.57 -
Sweden 0 0.31 - - 0.44 0.26 0.03 1.95 -
-1 -0.24 0.00 - - -0.16 - -
0.07 0.00 - 0.44 0.10 0.03 1.95 -
S w i t z e r l a n d 0 ----- - - 0 . 4 6
-1 - - 0.41 - - - - -
- - 0.41 - - - - 0.46
UK 0 -0.16 - - 0.07 - 0.75 0.74
-1 0.39 - 0.72 0.31 - - - -
0.23 - 0.72 0.31 0.07 - 0.75 0.74
U S A 0 ---- 0 . 1 6 0 . 0 2 2 . 4 5 0 . 4 6
-1 - 0.16 - 0.37 - - - 0.83
- 0.16 - 0.37 0.16 0.02 2.45 1.29
Average 0 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.84 0.22
-1 -0.04 0.02 0.17 0.10 -0.03 0.00 0.07 0.07
0.04 0.03 0.27 0.22 0.07 0.01 0.91 0.29
Memorandum: average elasticities for countries with significant asset price effects only
0 0.23 0.03 0.24 0.13 0.14 0.02 1.10 0.35
-1 -0.11 0.06 0.42 0.13 -0.04 0.01 0.09 0.11
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Table 3: Overall Fit of Estimations (R2 adj.)
1= Model without Asset Prices, 2= Model with Asset Prices 1/ taxes on 
financial and
direct taxes  direct taxes on  capital
on household on companies indirect taxes transactions
M o d e l  : 121212 1
Australia 0.76 0.81 0.22 0.51 0.86 0.90 0.37
Belgium 0.65 0.13 0.64 0.84 0.61
Canada 0.51 0.33 0.44 0.87 0.91 n.a.
Denmark 0.43 0.13 0.43 -0.06 0.48 0.41
Finland 0.60 0.12 0.30 0.84 0.85
France 0.30 0.17 0.50 0.96 0.97 0.54
Germany 0.52 0.14 0.17 0.94 0.68
Ireland 0.45 0.72 0.08 0.42 0.73 0.78 0.33
Italy 0.59 0.72 0.33 0.39 0.92 0.94 0.12
J a p a n 0 . 5 40 . 5 90 . 5 70 . 6 40 . 9 60 . 9 6 0 . 4 0
Netherlands 0.45 0.09 0.25 0.81 0.83 0.59
Norway 0.42 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.71 0.62
S p a i n 0 . 5 40 . 7 40 . 0 30 . 2 10 . 9 3 0 . 3 6
S w e d e n 0 . 5 40 . 9 40 . 0 90 . 3 60 . 6 70 . 8 7 0 . 2 4
Switzerland 0.53 0.20 0.46 0.87 0.44
UK 0.46 0.84 0.33 0.50 0.87 0.87 0.39
U S A 0 . 3 50 . 4 40 . 0 90 . 2 10 . 7 60 . 8 2 0 . 3 7
A v e r a g e 0 . 5 10 . 7 00 . 2 10 . 4 10 . 7 80 . 8 4 0 . 4 6
Average change
from 1 to 2 2/ 0.19 0.20 0.09
1/ For taxes on financial and capital transactions, in model 1 asset prices proxy tax bases
2/ Change in average from 1 to 2 only refers to countries with significant asset price effects





































Table 4: Asset Price Related Budget Sensitivities 
Increase/Decrease in Revenue, Given a 10% Asset Price Increase, in % of GDP
direct taxes  direct taxes on  indirect taxes taxes on financial
on households companies and capital 
transactions
lag 1/ Total (1) real estate stocks real estate stocks real estate stocks real estate stocks
( 2a ) ( 2b ) ( 3a ) ( 3b ) ( 4a ) ( 4b ) ( 5a ) ( 5b)
Australia 0 0.5 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.06
-1 -0.5 -0.56 0.12 -0.09
0.0 -0.56 0.12 0.23 0.09 0.02 0.06
Belgium 0 0.2 0.12 0.04
-1 0.0
0.2 0.12 0.04
Canada 0 0.2 0.12 0.10
-1 -0.1 -0.07
0.2 0.12 0.04
Denmark 0 0.4 0.35 0.07
-1 0.4 0.39 0.05 0.01
0.9 0.39 0.11 0.01
Finland 0 0.2 0.13 0.03
-1 0.2 0.12 0.04 0.01
0.3 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.04
France 0 0.3 0.18 0.06 0.01
-1 0.0 0.08 -0.12
0.2 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.01
Germany 0 0.1 0.04 0.01
-1 0.0
0.1 0.04 0.01
Ireland 0 0.3 0.20 0.11 0.02
-1 0.2 0.10 0.06
0.5 0.10 0.06 0.20 0.11 0.02
Italy 0 0.4 0.35 0.02 0.03
-1 0.1 0.14
0.5 0.35 0.14 0.02 0.03
Japan 0 0.4 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.01 0.01
-1 0.0
0.4 0.08 0.22 0.07 0.01 0.01
Netherlands 0 0.3 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.02
-1 0.0
0.3 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.02
Norway 0 0.5 0.26 0.26 0.02
-1 0.2 0.12 0.06
0.7 0.26 0.12 0.26 0.06 0.02
Spain 0 0.7 0.49 0.14 0.05 0.05
-1 -0.3 -0.28
0.5 0.21 0.14 0.05 0.05
Sweden 0 1.1 0.56 0.13 0.29 0.03 0.04
-1 -0.6 -0.44 -0.18
0.4 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.03 0.04
Switzerland 0 0.0 0.05
-1 0.1 0.09
0.1 0.09 0.05
UK 0 0.0 -0.16 0.08 0.04 0.04
-1 0.8 0.39 0.30 0.13
0.8 0.23 0.30 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.04
USA 0 0.1 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.00
-1 0.3 0.18 0.10 0.00
0.4 0.18 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01
Average total 0 0.33 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.02
-1 0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.38 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.02
Memorandum: average sensitivities for countries with significant asset price effects only
0 0.25 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.17 0.01 0.05 0.02
-1 -0.15 0.07 0.13 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.08 0.21 0.09 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.03
1/  0=current, -1= first lag
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Table 5: Excess Revenue in 2001 , Compared to 1997, Estimation  Based 
   
    Total asset  
 % change  Real estate rel.  % change  Stock price rel.  price related 
 real estate  budget effect  stock price  budget effect  budget effects 
 price index 1/  % of GDP  index 1/  % of GDP  % of GDP 
Finland  19.7  0.3  89.2  1.5  1.8 
           
Ireland  70.4  2.2  46.1  0.8  3.0 
           
Netherlands  53.8  1.4  8.4  0.0  1.4 
           
Norway  33.6  1.4  -11.6  -0.1  1.3 
           
Spain  27.8  1.1  16.8  0.1  1.2 
           
Sweden  38.9  1.1  19.2  0.3  1.4 
           
UK  39.0  2.5  -1.9  0.0  2.5 
           
USA  16.2  0.1  24.3  0.7  0.8 
Source: BIS, Datastream, and own calculations base on Table 4. 
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Annex Table 1: Revenue and tax base catogories, data sources, and time coverage 
Data category 
 
Source  Period covered 
Direct taxes on households  OECD  1965-2000 
Direct taxes on companies  OECD  1965-2000 
Indirect taxes  OECD  1965-2000 
Taxes on financial and capital transactions  OECD  1965-1998, missing: Canada 
Compensation of employees  Ameco  1960-2000 
Gross operating surplus  Ameco  1960-2000 
Private consumption  Ameco  1960-2000 
Disposable income  OECD  1960-2000, except country series starting later: 
Belgium (1970), Canada (1961), Denmark 
(1981), Spain (1964), Finland (1970), Ireland 
(1977), Italy (1961), Netherlands (1970), 
Norway (1975), all ending in 2000 
Gross domestic product  Ameco  1960-2000 
 
Annex Table 2: Asset price indices, data sources and time coverage 
 
Asset price index 
 
Source  Period covered 
Stock price index  BIS  Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, Norway,  
USA (1960-2000), Switzerland (1960-1997),  
UK (1963-2000) 
Stock price index  Datastream  Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands 
(1973-2000) 
Stock price index 
 
 





Real estate  price 
index 
(residential) 
BIS  1960-2000, except country series starting later:  
Netherlands (1965), USA (1968), UK (1969),  Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Finland, Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden (1970), Germany 
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Annex Table 3: Overview of Econometric Models
d) Taxes on financial and capital transactions
Model 1 Model 1
model aggregate number  model aggregate number 
specification elasticity of obs. specification elasticity of obs.
Australia Japan
real estate price index 25 real estate price index 31
stock price index 0 0.4 stock price index 0 0.26
other variables other variables AR 1, 2
Belgium Netherlands
real estate price index 0 1.19 25 real estate price index 0 1.11 25
stock price index 0 0.44 stock price index 0 0.27
other variables AR 1, 2 other variables AR 1, 2
Canada Norway
real estate price index n.a. n.a. real estate price index 0, -1, -2 1.19 26
stock price index n.a. n.a. stock price index
other variables other variables
Denmark Spain
real estate price index 0, -1 1.89 24 real estate price index 0 0.57 23
stock price index -1 0.23 stock price index
other variables other variables AR 1 
Finland Sweden
real estate price index 0, -1 1.05 27 real estate price index 0 1.95 28
stock price index D 90, D 94 stock price index
other variables other variables AR 1 
France Switzerland
real estate price index 0 1.25 24 real estate price index 31
stock price index 0 0.24 stock price index 0 0.46
other variables AR 1  other variables AR 1
Germany UK
real estate price index 0, -1 0.4 26 real estate price index 0 0.75 29
stock price index 0, -1 stock price index 0 0.74
other variables AR 1, 2 other variables AR 1
Ireland USA
real estate price index 0 1.4 25 real estate price index 0 2.45 30
stock price index 0 0.23 stock price index 0, -1 1.29
other variables AR 1, 2 other variables AR 1
Italy
real estate price index 0 0.3 26
stock price index
other variables AR 1, 2
Remark: in the column model specification the figures 0, -1, and -2 refer to lags of the respective variables, 
AR means autoregressive terms, and dummies are named like D 91 for 1991, ec-terms are error correction terms, 
aggregate elasticity means the sum of the elasticities of the different lags.
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